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THE PERSON AS SIGNATORY: CONTRACTARIAN SOCIAL
THEORY AT WORK IN SUBURBIA
Michael J Monahan

Political life can be understood as a manifestation of competing notions of what it means to be human. In other words, a political point of view can be understood as an implicit understanding
of what separates human beings, as political agents, from nonpolitical forms of life (which may include all or some animals, or
even in some cases homo sapiens who lack certain mental and/or
moral capacities) or mere objects. A given political view will also
have something to say about the relationship between particular
political agents, and the relation between humanity, in this normative sense, and non-humans. I would like to look closely at
what I take to be the dominant understanding of "the human"namely "contractarian" conceptions of social/politicallife-paying special attention to the symbolic representation of this understanding.
In referring to social theories and ways of interacting as "contractarian", I mean to capture a general belief or set of beliefs,
rather than any particular philosophical theory. Specifically, I
take any understanding of social interaction which uses an exchange of "goods" (material goods and/or "non-material goods")
as the principal model of social/political explanation and analysis to be "contractarian" in this sense. This view finds its clearest
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extent that one is able to engage in the exchange of goods and
services generally.2 Smith's description of the human "propensity
to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another"3 is first and
foremost a description of a contractual interaction in the very
sense understood by Thomas Hobbes. 4 Outside the realm of
"pure" economics, this exchange of goods may become somewhat more abstract, we may speak of exchanging "rights" for "security," or the distribution of "opportunity," but the basic model
remains intact whether one is performing a market analysis or
justifYing a legal sanction. Human interaction, according to this
way of thinking, can always be understood in terms of an exchange of goods, and questions of justice are largely, if not solely, a matter of the distribution of those goods and the contracts
(implicit or explicit) which govern that distribution. Thus, this
weaker, more general definition of "contractarian" would apply
not only to "social contract theorists" from Hobbes and Locke
through Rawls and Gauthier, but also to much of the received
opinion regarding human social interaction both in academia
generally, and in more mainstream "popular" discourse.
Having conquered the realms of economic, legal, and political
theory (or at least the "legitimate" varieties of these theories), the
social contract is forging into the more mundane territory of
basic human interaction on the immediate level of the relations
between family and friends. In other words, "the contract" has
become the dominant symbolic tool by which we make sense of
our relationship to the larger polity, to other individuals, and ultimately to ourselves. "Persons" are being replaced by "signatories". I will explore the effects of this symbol for human interaction by looking closely at a particular example-that of the
"Home Owners Association". By drawing out the implications of
this phenomenon, and appealing to the critique of this view of
human interaction offered in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, I will
argue that the notion of the contract is an impoverished way to
symbolically capture human relations, and ultimately serves not
only to cripple our understanding of those relations, but also
leads to a similarly impoverished understanding of self and
agency.
The advent of the "Home-Owners Association" (HOA) can be
seen as paradigmatic of the rise of contractarian representations
of humanity. An HOA is an institution designed primarily to protect the property value of a corresponding housing development.
The centerpiece for any given HOA is its body of Codes, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&R's), which is a set of rules and reg-
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ulations governing the home-owner's use of his/her property.
The CC&R's dictate the types of landscaping one my use, where
one may park one's vehicles, the colors of paint one may use on
one's exterior, and so on. Membership in the HOA is mandatory
upon the purchase of a home within the area governed by that
HOA, and a monthly membership fee is assessed. The fee covers
the administrative costs of the association, as well as the upkeep
of common areas within the "community". The Association is
o..d.m~\\i~texe.d. b'J 0.. committee elected by the membershi\l, and
regular meetings are held to decide the allocation of resources
and assess penalties for violation of the CC&R's. Often an HOA
will in turn be part of a larger HOA. In Las Vegas, Nevada, for
example, the large "master-planned community" of Summerlin
has three main HOA's, each one consisting of dozens of smaller
individual HOA's. Once one has purchased a home within one of
these communities, and thereby joined one or more HOA's, one
is bound by the CC&R's of the appropriate HOA's. Failure to
abide by the CC&R's can result in substantial fees, and failure to
pay the assigned fees can result in a lien being placed upon one's
property. The political and economic ramifications of this phenomenon are significant and worthy of exploration,5 but the present concern is with the ways in which HOA's make implicit assumptions and characterizations of what it means to be human.
In other words, how does the HOA affect the individual's experience of her relation to her fellow members, to non-members,
and ultimately to herself? Or, put yet differently, how does the
HOA alter her consciousness of the humanity of those around her
as well as her own? The question, then, is ultimately one of a phenomenology of the HOA. Phenomenology, as the term is being employed here, can best be understood as "reflective thought upon
what can be called objects of thought ... or, better yet, objects of
consciousness."6 The task, then, is to reflect upon the way in
which one's consciousness of one's place in the social world is
influenced by membership in an HOA. The specific example provided below should be understood as only the most general characterization of HOA's.7 Surely these particular examples are not
common to all individual HOA's. The basic structure and content
of the rules governing home-owners is very nearly universal, but
the strictness of their enforcement varies (this variation in enforcement actually can serve to strengthen some of my criticism,
as will become evident below). The generality of my use of examples does not pose an immediate problem, however. As mentioned above, the primary focus of this project of reflection will
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be the way in which our understanding of the human comes to
be mediated by the symbolic schema of the contract, and this basic
schema remains intact regardless of the variations in enforcement.
One of the primary experiences upon entering an HOA-governed area (the common word for this is a "community," but for
reasons which will become apparent later, I will refrain from
using this term) is that of isolation. If we look at any typical suburb, we will see a collection of discreet, self-contained units. Individual, single-family dwellings, separated by some amount (however small) of yard, and usually a fence. Pair this with individual
vehicular transportation, and the lack of a central cultural or
community meeting place, and there is little reason or even opportunity for people to interact. Still, children will often meet
each other (usually at school) and begin to form connections between households, which can start to enable home-owners to
develop relationships with those who live near them. The geography of the suburb supports a strong sense of isolation, but
through the mediation of children, this experience is occasionallyovercome.
Once we add an HOA to this context, however, things change.
The document which governs the HOA, the CC&R's, usually has
clear rules regulating the levels of noise and the kinds of activity,
that can take place within sight of other members of the HOA.
Some of the most frequent complaints (and any given complaint
can, and often does, ultimately lead to a fine) result from the
activities of children. What is more, the complaint is always
lodged against the owner of the house at which the violation of
the CC&R's takes place. Thus, it is not in any given home-owner's
interests to have children anywhere near the house, and certainly not in significant numbers. If home-owner A's children violate
the CC&R's at home-owner B's house, then B will be cited for the
violation. To be sure, children might congregate in small numbers, provided they remain indoors, but this provides little opportunity for the kinds of interaction required to establish connection between parents, and so any relationship between homeowners remains vicarious at best.
Indeed, not only is the gathering of children discouraged by
the typical HOA, but any kind of public display of human activity (with the exception of yard-workS) can be a cause for complaint, and a possible violation of the CC&R's. By way of example,
a family moved into a home governed by an HOA in Las Vegas.
This family had the habit of spending their evenings sitting in the
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front yard. Many of us from small towns are familiar with this
practice. It is a way to make oneself available to see passersby and
be seen by them-it is in many ways an invitation to interact with
others. Within a month, a half-dozen different complaints had
been lodged against this family, and at the next general meeting,
they were held in violation of the CC&R'S.9 They were, in effect,
forbidden to sit in their front yard. What this points to is the fact
that members of an HOA are often effectively compelled to shut
themselves away in their homes out of the sight of those who live
near them. There is indeed a concerted effort to remove, as
much as possible, any evidence of human occupancy. In many
CC&R's, it is forbidden to park in one's driveway, and certainly
not allowed to park in the street. One's car is kept in one's garage, the door of which must be kept closed. Thus, it is possible
for one to come and go from one's house without ever having to
be directly visible to others.
All of this adds up to an effort to enforce a kind of isolation
upon the individual home-owners. The implicit goal of the
CC&R's is to limit interaction between home owners outside of
general meetings, at which time all interaction is mediated directly by the HOA contract. Thus, the implied ideal state is one in
which each individual member experiences his or her home-life
as if he or she were the only person living in the area. lo Ideally,
one should be able to glimpse one's neighbors within a given
week only rarely, and never be compelled actually to interact with
them. At the same time that one is compelled to keep, as much
as possible, to oneself, one is also encouraged to keep an eye out
for infractions committed by others. The CC&R's, after all, are
designed to preserve property values and maintain the beauty
and order of the area, and so it is important that each member
report violations of the CC&R's such that the appropriate steps
may be taken. Thus, each member finds him or herself in a rather
ironic position. He or she is encouraged to attend, as much as
possible, to the activities of his or her neighbors so as to preserve
the general sense of isolation of all members. In other words, one
watches others closely, so that nothing occurs which might jeopardize one's sense of being alone. One watches so as to ensure
that no one is seen.
This focus upon isolation is directly linked to the way in which
contractual mediation of human relations operates. It is part of
the logic of the contract that each signatory operates as an atomistic individual in the pursuit of his or her self-interest. At the
foundation of any contractarian social interaction is a thorough-
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going ontological atomism. Indeed, were it not for this fundamental atomism, there would be no need for a contract to bind
us together in the first place. In the case of the HOA, we see this
ontology taken to its logical conclusion. By viewing ones relationship with others in terms of a contract, one finds oneself enmeshed in a system of rules and expectations which encourages
one to live this underlying atomism to the fullest. Yet in order to
best achieve and maintain this isolation we must enter into a contract designed for that purpose-our isolation requires a certain
(admittedly limited) degree of interaction. Once again, a strong
sense of irony emerges. In order even to approximate our ideals
of individualism, we must interact with others not only initially,
but constantly.
What is particularly curious about this interaction is that it is
always seeking to disguise itself from its participants. There is interaction, but it is always at a distance, highly mediated, and diffuse. One receives a "friendly reminder" in the mail regarding
the length of one's grass. Failure to comply with this reminder results in the receipt of a notification of violation of the CC&R's.
Even if one brings this matter before a meeting of the board, the
interaction presents itself as occurring between the home-owner
and the contract of the CC&R's, rather than between the homeowner and his or her neighbors. Legitimate appeal may only be
made to "the rules," whether or not they were broken, and what
the appropriate punishment ought to be if they were. In other
words, the interaction required to maintain the sense of isolation
preserved by the CC&R's is always cloaked in the language and
symbolism of the contract, such that it appears to the participants
as anything but actual interaction in any meaningful sense of the
term. There is no attempt to understand the position of one's
interlocutors, no appeal to empathy or sympathy. Indeed, such
appeals and attempts violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the
con tract, by generating an atmosphere of "prejudice" or "bias."
Thus, while interaction takes place, and remains necessary for
the preservation of individualism, that interaction is mediated by
the contract in such a way as to obfuscate much of its underlying
significance.
At the same time, this effort on the part of the CC&R's to keep
the various home-owners out of sight takes the form of a kind of
enforced homogeneity. Bearing in mind that all landscaping and
home-improvements are strictly controlled by the CC&R's in
order to secure the "beauty" of the area and thereby maintain
and increase property value, we find that the result is a marked
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similarity between one house and another. Lawns must be uniformly green,!! satellite dishes must be tucked discreetly into corners, and so on. No changes may be made which will make a particular property "stand out" from the others. In short, any thing
which significantly individuates a given house is strictly discouraged. The aesthetic underlying the sense of "property value" being here protected is one which is fundamentally characterized
by uniformity.
This points to yet another irony. In the context of the effort to
preserve the integrity of the individual from incursion from what
is understood as external, it comes about that the individual, as a
particular social agent, all but disappears. Within the atomistic
understanding of agency underlying the contractual schema, the
presence of property which "stands out" in some way is understood as a threat to the stability of one's status as an individual.
Since property which distinguishes itself in this way forces one to
confront the presence of another agent (since the property
stands as a kind of vicarious reflection of the personality of the
owner), and that other agent is understood as fundamentally
external, then the presence of the offending property becomes a
literal incursion into the sanctity of one's private realm. Regardless of the aesthetic merits of a given individuating feature, it
must be an "eyesore" inasmuch as it is a threat to the isolated
individualism of the other home-owners. Thus one finds that the
pursuit of individual integrity (individualism) ultimately erases
one's individuality. A kind of strong homogeneity results, in
which each individual is more or less secure in his or her property, provided of course that individual does nothing which sets
him or her apart from others.
This is one point at which the aforementioned variations in the
strictness of enforcement of the CC&R's can become an important issue. There exist, to be sure, some HOA-governed areas
which are hardly different from any "normal" suburb. This is usually a resul t of very lax enforcement of the existing CC&R's. However, regardless of whether in fact they are being enforced, that
the rules remain intact, though dormant, is nevertheless important. This means that at any time they can be brought out and
employed against those who are understood as a threat to the
property value of the "community." This point can be best illuminated through appeal to race. Historically, it was possible, until
very recently, to place racially restrictive "covenants" (which were
frequently supported by the Federal Housing Authority) upon
property which prevented that property from being sold to non-
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whites (including, often, Jews).12 While these kinds of explicit restrictions are no longer legal, there remain more subtle ways to
maintain de facto racial segregation. Beyond the "invisible hand"
of market forces, which go a long way toward maintaining segregation of housing, there are more direct instruments such as
CC&R's. Even in HOA's where the CC&R's remain largely unenforced, if a new home-owner appears to his or her neighbors
to be "suspicious," "unreliable," "shiftless," or even "dangerous,"
that that new home-owner will be the object of disproportionate
scrutiny. Rules and restrictions which may have been historically
dormant may be employed to neutralize the new "threat" to the
security and property value of the neighborhood. Thus, even
though there are variations in the enforcement of the CC&R's,
there is a sense in which, given the prevailing dominance of racist
understandings of who counts as a "desirable" neighbor,l~ and the
underlying drive toward homogeneity (purity) within the "community," even the less-strict HOA's serve to support this underlying atomism-one's status as an isolated individual is protected
so long as one conforms to behavioral (and racial) norms.
All of these effects upon the behavior and experiences of the
membership brought about by an HOA engenders a fundamental shift in the relations between individuals not only within the
area governed by the CC&R's, but also between those individuals
and the "outside" world. One's relation to other members of the
HOA is above all mediated by and interpreted according to the
"contract" which constitutes HOA membership. One may certainly take an interest in the behavior of fellow HOA members,
but only in terms of the extent to which they successfully uphold
the terms of the contract (obey the CC&R's). In fact, if one is to
be a more or less ideal signatory, one should endeavor to avoid
coming to know other members in too great a degree of intimacy, for this might cause one to show favoritism or bias in the
enforcement of the CC&R's. As already discussed, members are
related strictly by means of the HOA contract, and any familiarity above and beyond this formal level stands as a threat to the
integrity of that contract. The isolation of the agent, therefore,
goes beyond the purely geographic and becomes an implicit
restraint upon the formation of anything beyond the most casual of relationships with fellow HOA members.
Lastly, though certainly not least in import or significance, the
HOA greatly influences and conditions the way in which individual members come to understand themselves as agents. Primarily,
it serves to reinforce the understanding of oneself as an isolated
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individual unit which happens to share loose, and purely formal,
bonds with other similar atomistic units. Of course, since the contract serves primarily to protect this isolation, any attempt to transcend this assumed atomism must be understood as at least suspect, if not explicitly hostile. As mentioned above, most of one's
interaction with other members takes place either by means of
surveillance to ensure the enforcement of the CC&R's, or at the
regular general meetings, at which time one is typically judging
the guilt of others, or defending oneself against the accusations
of others. This quickly fosters an atmosphere of suspicion among
the membership such that any attempt to transcend this basic
contractual relationship is typically understood to be either an
attempt to uncover hidden violations on the one hand, or to
overlook particular violations on the other. Ultimately, however,
the individual member is urged to understand herself as alone in
the world, surrounded by similarly lone agents who are indifferent to one's well-being at best, or downright hostile at worst. The
primary goal must then be to secure one's own position as much
as possible on the one hand, and weaken the position of those
who stand to do one harm on the other. The sole outlet for "political" agency is by means of the contract, and the primary goal of
the contract is the preservation of individualism. The HOA thus
generates a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. In assuming isolated,
atomistic, radically self-interested political agents, the HOA contract produces rules which foster an attitude of atomism, isolation, and self-interest.
One way to illustrate this shift in the relationship between
members is by looking more closely at the term "neighbor." On
the one hand, there is a kind of descriptive, geographical sense
of the term, which connotes nothing more than a certain proximity of domicile. One's "neighbors" in this sense are simply
those who live within a certain area, and in this way one may have
neighbors whom one has never seen or met. Without doubt, the
members of an HOA are neighbors in this sense. Yet on the other
hand, there is also a prescriptive, normative sense of the term,
which connotes a certain interest in the well being of others, or
at least a mutual respect or regard. Indeed, the concept of
"neighborly" behavior makes little, if any, sense in the purely descriptive context, and refers explicitly to the idea that there is
some norm for behavior between neighbors which transcends
simple spatial-relations. "Good neighbors" will lend cups of sugar
or power tools, will collect the mail while one is away, and generally make gestures of good will and congeniality. Within the con-
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text of an HOA, it may be said that one's neighbors in the descriptive sense, are seldom neighbors in the normative sense.
Think, for example, of the way in which disputes might be settled among neighbors in the normative sense of the term. The
"good" neighbor does not respond to disputes by immediately
phoning the police, or writing his/her congress member, or
pouring sugar in the offender's gas tank. To do so would indeed
be taken as a demonstration of one's "badness" as a neighbor.
Rather, what is expected is that the neighbor will raise his/her
complaint with the offender in order to reach some sort of amicable accommodation. If the offender is also a "good" neighbor,
then he/she will likewise attempt to reach an agreement. Again,
if the offender instead simply walks away, or slams the door, or
produces a firearm, this would be understood as the behavior of
a "bad" neighbor. In short, the effort to resolve the conflict, provided both parties are "good" neighbors, will be cooperative, in
the sense that each must come to some better understanding of
the position of the other, and work to find some way to best accommodate both of their interests. Thus, in order for this effort
to succeed, each party must in some way become more familiar
with the habits and interests of the other-the neighbor has to
become more well known as a person.
This points toward an important shift in the symbolic representation of our relation to others. The idea of the "neighbor," in
the normative sense of the term, suggests a way of interacting
with others which required at least a tentative move beyond the
abstract notion of a bearer of rights and toward an understanding of the other as a fully-fledged individual agent, whose interests
and goals one ought to respect not because of any kind of contractual agreement, but rather because one has come to recognize
the importance and integrity of that agent as such. One comes to
see the way in which one's neighbors, inasmuch as they are all situated in the same social context, are at the same time reflections
of and conditioning factors in one's own status as a neighbor.
Our shared interests are not the result of some formal or informal contract, but rather a matter of this shared social context
which generates and conditions our interests in the same way that
it conditions and renders possible our ability to individuate ourselves.
What, then, is one to make of the phenomenon of the HOA?
Given the effective hegemony of contractarian understandings of
social life it exemplifies, and the degree to which this dominance
has been increasing in recent years, it is worthwhile to take a seri-
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ous look at its implicit assumptions, and its possible strengths and
weaknesses. Hegel is a particularly fruitful figure with whom to
take up this endeavor, for several reasons. First, his views influence, or at least lurk in the background, of many subsequent critiques,14 and so a clear understanding of Hegel can be critical to
any fruitful employment of those more recent critiques. Second,
he is not simply dismissive of contractarian views, but places them
in a larger context which highlights their weaknesses, to be sure,
but also their strengths. Lastly, his analysis of contractarian social
theory is situated in an attempt to shed light upon the understanding of what it means to be a human agent, and how we might
achieve a full and robust expression of that humanity. In the interests of brevity, I will limit my exegesis to the discussion of those
ways of thinking I have labeled "contractarian" offered in the Philosophy of Right-specifically, I will focus upon Hegel's critique of
the notions of self and freedom which lie at the heart of contractbased conceptions of humanity and human interaction. 15
The bulk of Hegel's discussion of contract takes place in the
"Abstract Right" section of the Philosophy of Right. The abstractness of right referenced here lies in the fact that in this moment
of the dialectic, the understanding of the human agent, and social interaction, is more or less "formal", in the sense that an
attempt is made to reduce the political agent to a "universal"
abstraction, as opposed to a "particular" and concrete individual. 16 That is, the agent is conceived of as being a self-contained,
immediately given social unit which is "abstracted" from every
"contingent" feature by which we normally distinguish between
particular individuals. One's status as a political agent is given
prior to any concrete details about that person's life. Indeed, a
standard claim ofliberal political theory is that such "contingent"
details about a person's life are, or at least ought to be, politically irrelevant. This is in many ways the entire point of Rawls' "veil
of ignorance," which invites us to abstract from the world of the
here and now, and posit ourselves as more or less featureless
political units. Hobbes' state of nature serves much the same purpose, positing an "original position" in which all agents are more
or less equal, and the resulting social contract may be based upon
the rational decisions of these relatively featureless nascent political actors. The social/political world, within this context, thus
takes the form of a limitation and mediation of the interaction
between these abstracted individual units.
Ifwe understand the human agent in terms of an abstract political unit without any "contingent" historical, social, or psycho-
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logical features, then our understanding of the "self," for any
given agent, is reduced to what is effectively a mathematical
point. If what it means to be a political agent is to be capable of
possessing property, or a bearer of rights, and nothing more, then
indeed the very notion of political agency is reduced to a kind of
literal emptiness. To be an agent is simply to be a vessel capable of
holding or bearing certain important elements. Thus, what distinguishes one agent from another is merely a matter of the various elements which come to fill this vessel. I7 What is more, since
the self is reduced to this notion of a content-less vessel, it follows
that all else is external and other. 18 This includes not only those
things which one may come to possess, but also other agents, as
well as those historical, political, and psychological features of
our own which have been deemed irrelevant. Again, reflecting
upon the basic assumptions of classical contract theory makes
this point more clearly. In the pre-social "original position"
(whether it be an actual part of history, as Hobbes seems to suggest, or an hypothetical construct, as with Rawls), the nascent
political agents exist as individual atoms, working furiously to
acquire those "goods" needed to satisfy their desires. When at last
these agents come to realize that their constant competition
might be doing more harm than good, they begin to engage in
the exchange of those goods they have acquired. This is the contract. In other words, "I" exist only as a bearer of rights and property, and my only means of interaction and relation to other
agents is through the exchange of those rights and property,
mediated by an implicit or explicit contract. All of those features
which serve to distinguish the agent as an individual are pushed
to the periphery and rendered "external," such that only the
pure, atomistic political unit remains in the analysis.
Along with this notion of self as an abstracted individual bearer of rights comes a corresponding notion of freedom, and it is
here that Hegel commences his critique. He states: "The freedom
of the will, according to this determination, is arbitrariness, in
which the following two factors are contained: free reflection,
which abstracts from everything, and dependence on an inwardly or externally given content and material."19 The problem with
this notion of freedom, for Hegel, is that it leads to an idea of
freedom based upon contingency, and a conception of self based
upon contradiction. 20 This means on one hand that in holding that
freedom lies in "doing what one pleases" (arbitrariness), it follows that for any particular action one should take, or thing one
should claim (as property), that such action or possession should
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be at any given time purely contingent-it should be the case that
one can just as easily refute the action, or rid oneself of the
object. The "free" will, in this sense, is something which has no
substantive connection to any particular content of willing. In
other words, in order for any given decision or action to be considered free in this sense, it must be the case that the content of
that decision or action be understood as more or less incidental
and contingent.
At the same time, this contingency means that for any given
subject, the content of that subject's will (expressed through action) remains fundamentally external. Since the arbitrary content
is contingent or incidental to the subject as such, a hard distinction is maintained between the subject and that particular content of the subject's will. By way of an (rather trivial) example,
suppose one chooses to wear a certain kind of shoe. But if that
choice is free, in this sense, then it must be the case that one
could,just as easily, not so choose. Thus the particular content of
the decision is rendered contingent. One asserts one's desire to
wear the shoe, but at the same time asserts that this desire is in no
way determinate of one's self or in any way limits one's freedom
(as arbitrariness)-and therein lies the contradiction. For each
choice-each act of will-requires some determinate, particular
content. But in order to affirm the contingency of this content,
one must also posit the particular determination as fundamentally not mine. One may "freely" choose one's shoes, to follow the
example, but the shoes in no way reflect upon one's identity-the
choice is thereby contradicted, and rendered "external." The
contradiction lies in that fact that for each act of willing, which is
fundamentally an act of affirmation ("/ will this"), there must be
a corresponding negation ("but this in no way fixes or limits my
agency"). Each choice or action is thus mine and simultaneously
not mine.
This way of understanding freedom and the self, for Hegel, is
ultimately self defeating. If it is taken to be the case that the standard for freedom is a content-less, abstracted, atomistic "I," such
that this subject is free to the degree that it is unfettered by
"external" boundaries, forces, and compulsions, then it follows
that any content, any determination of the will, necessarily results
in a decrease in freedom, since it erects certain boundaries
around the subject. 21 If the ideal free agent is understood as a radically undetermined subject with the potential for virtually any
decision or action, then any actual decision or action must be understood as at least partially undermining that freedom. That is,
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every act of will, inasmuch as it requires some determinate content to the will, contradicts the espoused ideal of a content-less
subject. 22 Thus, Hegel suggests that there is a kind of internal inconsistency or contradiction lurking behind the notion of freedom and the subject which lays the groundwork for contractarianlsm.
The contradictions at the heart of this picture of the subject go
even deeper, however. The espoused ideal is the radically undetermined, content-less subject-the universal, abstracted "I," in
Hegel's own terminology. Hegel argues that this ideal, iffollowed
to its logical conclusion, ultimately yields a nonsensical demand
upon the subject. For the demand to be without determination, is,
when compared to all forms of determination, in itself a fully
determined position. 23 The injunction to avoid all positive content
and particularity as contrary to freedom in itself places a clear
and specific restraint upon the agent-namely, do not will. Just as
any concrete act of will, any determination or particularity, closes off certain potentialities and possibilities for future action, the
desire to avoid all determination and particularity effectively closes off, or at least renders odious, all concrete acts of will save one:
will nothing. But inasmuch as the willing of nothing requires a
determined stance on the part of the subject, it constitutes an internal contradiction.
By way of an admittedly extreme example, imagine a person
who takes this ideal of freedom to its logical conclusion and holds
that any determination, since it places restrictions upon her abstracted subjectivity, is contrary to her espoused ideal. She avoids
any political or social affiliation, since formal group-membership
usually carries with it certain performative, or at least ideological,
obligations. Indeed, she may refuse, or at least avoid, most sorts
of social interaction, since these often lead to feelings of obligation and commitment, both of which undermine her "integrity"
as an atomistic individual. She must also avoid appeal or reference to linguistic, cultural, racial, gender, national, or historical
background or context, since all of these serve to impose "external" expectations and interpretations upon her pure, undetermined subjectivity. And so on. When taken to its logical conclusion, our hypothetical adherent to this view of self and freedom
must effectively isolate herself from the "outside" world, spending as much time as possible alone, avoiding any activity which
might somehow add positive content to her understanding of
self, and thereby undermine her "freedom." She will, effectively,
incarcerate herself in order to preserve what she takes to be her
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liberty. This is the contradiction Hegel sees operating in this understanding of self and freedom. Seldom do people actually carry
this notion so far, but we need not stretch our observational
capacities to find more ordinary manifestations of this paradigm
all around us.
Contractarian social and political theories, inasmuch as Hegel
takes them to rest upon these basic notions of self and freedom,
are likewise doomed to contradiction. Hegel does not dismiss contract theories outright, however. He takes the emphasis upon individuality to be an improvement over tradition-bound or theocratic
forms of political organization. Unlike such traditional autocratic
social structures, which tend toward the complete dissolution of
the individual in the larger polity, the advent of modern political
theory, which emphasizes the freedom of the individual, makes it
possible for both the individual and the larger polity to more fully
express themselves. The institution of the contract, focusing as it
does upon the agent as an individual acting in accordance with his
or her individual desires, provides the context in which the agent
is able to develop and express herself as an individual, which in
turn strengthens and diversifies the polity as a whole. 24
Furthermore, Hegel holds that genuine human agency and
genuine freedom are a matter of seeing oneself reflected in the
larger whole, and seeing the larger whole reflected in oneself.
Thus, rather than understanding the agent as an atomistic bearer of rights and property, such that the "external" world stands
over and against one's understanding of self, Hegel urges us to
see the social world as the context which renders our agency possible in the first place. 2" Rather than positing self-contained individual units which come together to form social structures, he
thinks of individuals arising through a process of individuation
from a larger (and in a certain sense logically prior) socialorganism. What makes one an individual is a matter of the relationship
one holds to other agents, to larger social institutions, and so on.
The individualism engendered by contractarian models of social
interaction, however, fosters an understanding of agency which
attempts to avoid connection with this larger context, and in so
doing posits a self which is a featureless abstraction. All particular features which distinguish a given agent from another come
to be marginalized as "merely contingent" and ultimately irrelevant. In other words, individualism undermines individuality.
The problems for contract theory arise, according to Hegel,
when its ideals and modes of understanding are taken too far.26
The exchange of property and the modes of self-expression and
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self-development which it engenders ought to be a part of a
healthy society, but this should be only a relatively minor moment
in a larger context of cooperation and full participation in institutions which exist above and beyond the abstracted individual.
If this moment of individualism and contractual interaction
comes to be the sole model for understanding human agency and
social being, then it is hardly an improvement on the traditional
and autocratic societies it replaced. This contractual moment is
only constructive, Hegel believes, when it is embedded in a larger social context to which is remains subordinate. A healthy society
requires well-developed individual agents, but when those individual agents become the sole end of social interaction, then not
only with the larger social whole be adversely impacted, by the
individual agents themselves will suffer from the crippling of the
social context within which they are situated.
One way to flesh-out Hegel's criticism here is by focusing upon
the way in which contract theory invites a particular way of conceptualizing "the human." Specifically, it is important to look at
the kinds of symbols it employs to capture and reinforce this particular view of humanity. Again it is helpful to look at the economic model. To be a "consumer" or a "producer" or an "employer" is a matter of one's ability to assume a particular role in a
contractual relationship. At the same time, social contract theory, from Hobbes to Rawls to Gauthier, can in many ways be understood as applying an economic model to the political world. The
relation between the citizen and the state-the contract in question-is a matter of an exchange of certain goods between mutually consenting (at least hypothetically) parties. I surrender some
of my natural rights to the state in exchange for security. And just
as one's status as an economic agent is a matter of one's ability to
engage in economic transactions, so is one's status as a political
agent, within the context of social contract theory, a matter of
one's ability to enter into contractual arrangements. In the end,
we arrive at a new symbol of the human agent-the "signatory".
What makes us human is our ability to enter into contracts, since
human interaction takes place only by means of various implicit
and explicit contracts. That is, since each political unit exists primarilyas an abstracted bearer of rights and/ or property, it is only
through an exchange of rights and/or property that these units
are able to interact. Conversely, those who are not, for whatever
reason, signatories of the various contracts which govern our behavior are outside the bounds humanity itself, in the sense that all
rights, duties, obligations, and protections are based in the con-
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tract, and those outside of the contract have no rights which genuine or full humans are bound to respect. 27
It should be possible at this point to see how Hegel's critique
reflects upon the example provided by the HOA. The basic
assumptions of contractarianism generate an understanding of
humanity and human interaction that necessitates the formation
of formal contracts governing that interaction. If all human interaction is ultimately understood as characterized by contractual
relations, there emerges a drive to spell out contractual relations
governing all human interactions. It thus becomes necessary to
formulate concrete rules and restrictions which mediate the interaction of individuals who happen to share adjacent property.
Once rules and norms for behavior based upon this model begin
to take hold, they condition one's understanding of self and
one's place in the larger world such that the original assumptions
begin to appear true. Given one's role as subject to and an enforcer of the CC&R's, one "naturally" begins to behave in a way
which approximates the ideal agent in the contractarian schema.
But lurking in the background there is a constant tension. For
the behavior required within this model, as we have seen, is
fraught with ironic and often contradictory patterns. In the Orwellian world of the HOA, to be a true individual one must eradicate individuality. To be free one must be effectively isolated
from the rest of the world. Human "relationships" are characterized by a basic lack of familiarity or intimacy. In short, the preservation of one's integrity as an "agent" requires the mortification
of one's sense of selfand the crippling of one's ability to take seriously the goals and interests of others on the most basic-most
human-level.
And this leads to the heart of Hegel's critique of the social contract. For the symbolism of contractarian social theories fails in
any but the most superficial of ways to capture the significance of
what it means to be human. A "signatory" to a contract is a featureless abstraction. What makes one a signatory is nothing more
than one's possession of some "good" which can be exchanged
for some other good. Indeed, contracts are frequently entered
into by artificial "persons", such as corporations, which exist only
by virtue of their capacity to "own" assets. That fact that contracts
hold actual human beings and corporations to be social and moral equals goes a long way toward pointing out exactly why contract theories cannot adequately capture what it means to be human. The failure of this symbolism is by no means accidental, for
contractarian theories strip human agents of much of what

132/MONAHAN

i,
I

makes us agents in the first place. Our relationships to other persons, to larger social contexts, and to ourselves as parts of this
larger context, are all rendered "external" by the notion of the
contract, and in their place we are left with empty, featureless vessels-bearers of rights and property.28
The proper response to this failure of contractarian symbols
and understandings of humanity is not simply some nostalgic return to "good old days." Rather, if we listen to Hegel, what is
needed is an effort to preserve what is valuable in contractarian
thinking, while limiting or expunging its excesses. This purpose
may be served by a revisiting of older symbols, such as that of the
"neighbor," but this return to older symbols must never be naively or uncritically undertaken. Neighborhoods, even in the normative sense, can be prone to episodes of xenophobia, reactionary isolationism, and naive conformity to tradition and "respectability." A healthy respect for individuality is a welcome respite
from some of these more odious tendencies. It may be, to maintain this particular context, that a return to the symbol of the
"neighbor" may be just as unsatisfying as the symbol of the "signatory," though surely in different ways. But if we pay attention to
what was positive in each, what best represented a more critically
engaged and sophisticated understanding of humanity, we may
begin to move toward a means of symbolizing the human which
avoids some of the pitfalls of its predecessors. The first task, and
most important in the short term, is to draw attention to the failures of contractarian symbolism, in all of its forms and contexts.
Its hegemony must be called into question at every turn, but without falling into the trap or outright and naive dismissal. As long
as its assumptions regarding humanity remain unchallenged, and
are understood as "human nature," our status as human beings,
and our relationship to the world around us, will continue to
worsen.
In the final passage of Frantz Fanon's Wretched of the Earth, he
urges us to "turn over a new leaf, [to] work out new concepts, and
try to set afoot a new man."29 One important part of this monumental task will be exactly the sort of re-symbolizing of the
human toward which I have gestured here. The "new concepts"
should bring humanity out from behind the uniform fences and
well-manicured lawns which preserve the illusion of isolation
from the rest of the world. Our new symbolism must enable us to
see and recognize those who have been, and continue to be,
excluded from our "social contract," not only in our own cities,
but in every corner of the globe. Inasmuch as the atomistic sym-
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bolism of the social contract serves to obfuscate the reality of
human misery and oppression, and our own role in the maintenance of that oppression, an important task will be the transcendence of that symbolism, and the setting afoot of a new understanding of human being.
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